Michigan Law Review
Volume 62

Issue 2

1963

Securities Regulation-SEC Rule 10b-5-Recovery by Corporation
Induced by Fraud of Insider to Issue Shares
Charles K. Dayton
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles K. Dayton, Securities Regulation-SEC Rule 10b-5-Recovery by Corporation Induced by Fraud of
Insider to Issue Shares, 62 MICH. L. REV. 339 (1963).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1963]

RECENT DECISIONS

339

SECURITIES REGULATI ON-SEC RuLE IOb-5-REcoVERY BY CORPORATION INDUCED BY FRAUD OF INSIDER To IssuE SHARES-Trustees in reorganization of a corporation brought suit on its behalf to recover damages
under section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule IOb-5
of the Securities and Exchange Commission,2 alleging that the corporation

1 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any national
securities exchange • • .
"(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1958).
2 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
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had been fraudulently induced by defendant, its comptroller, to issue stock
for inadequate consideration. Also named as defendants were the American
Stock Exchange and several banks and brokers, whose alleged complicity in
the improper public distribution of the shares made them parties to the
scheme to defraud the corporation. On a motion by all defendants but the
comptroller to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
based upon the assertion that the corporation had no rights under rule
IOb-5 where corporate mismanagement was at issue, held, motion to dismiss
denied. An issuing corporation's right to recover under rule IOb-5 against
those participating in a scheme to defraud it of its stock is not precluded
by the fact that the fraud was perpetrated by a corporate insider. Pettit v.
'American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
A corporation induced by fraud to issue its stock for overvalued compensation was first held to be within the protection of section IO(b) in
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 3 where the Fifth Circuit ruled that
the legislative standard of "in the public interest" 4 was broad enough to
include such a corporation, and that the issuance of stock was a "sale"
within the meaning of rule IOb-5. While this liberal interpretation has been
criticized as inconsistent with the legislative history of the 1934 act, 5 the
right of a corporation to avail itself of the benefits of the rule has been
recognized in several other decisions. 6 The principal case, however, is the
first to uphold a corporate right of recovery under rule IOb-5 for acts which
would also constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation by an
insider.7
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange • . •
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1949).
3 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). Although neither
lO(b) nor rule lOb-5 provides for civil liability, it is well established that a remedy for
investors is implicit under the principle that a violation of a statute creates a claim in
favor of an injured party intended to be protected by the act. E.g., Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934). For an
extensive criticism of this result in light of the legislative history of § l0(b), see Ruder,
Civil Liability Under Rule 10-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L.
REV. 627 (1963).
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § l0(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1958).
5 See 59 MICH. L. REv. 1267 (1961); 13 STAN. L. REv. 378 (1961); cf. Ruder, supra note
3, at 654; Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1948).
6 H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (allowed without consideration of the problem); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del.
1960) (employed as a basis for federal jurisdiction); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292
F.2d 824 (3d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Slavin v. Germantown Fire
Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum).
7 Corporations have been permitted to sue in their capacity as investors under rule
lOb-5. Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); 13 STAN. L. REv. 378,
380-81, nn.7, 8 (1961).
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The court in the principal case was confronted with dicta in two decisions of its own court of appeals to the effect that the only rights granted
to a corporate issuer or its stockholders by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 are those which the statute expressly created. In distinguishing the
Second Circuit's holding in Howard v. Furst 8 that a corporation has no right
to enjoin improper proxy solicitations under section I4(a) 9 and rule 14a-9,10
the court reasoned that the policy of preventing harassment of insurgents
in a proxy context, which justified denial of that right, did not apply when
a corporation had been defrauded of its stock.11 The principal obstacle to
the court's holding, however, appears to be the dictum in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp. 12 that section IO(b) and rule l0b-5 were not intended
to protect a corporation from a breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate
insider. Conceding that questions of internal corporate affairs should not be
subject to federal jurisdiction when a purchase or sale of securities is only
"incidental to a major mismanagement issue," the court in the principal
case nevertheless reasoned that the participation of corporate insiders should
not prevent the application of the rule to an illegal securities transaction.
It would seem that questions of corporate mismanagement to which the
rule is inapplicable may best be differentiated from stock fraud on the basis
of an issuing corporation's status as a "seller."13 Such a distinction clearly
circumvents the Birnbaum decision, since the final holding in that case was
that the plaintiff corporation, which was not a party to the transaction,
had not been alleged to be a purchaser or seller and was therefore not
within the scope of the rule. 14
The court's application of rule I0b-5 in favor of the issuing corporation,
despite the involvement of an insider, has been criticized on the ground
that it is inconsistent to impose a federal standard of fiduciary duty in connection with all the internal affairs of a corporation which are related to an
allegedly fraudulent transfer of its securities, while leaving other aspects of
corporate management to state Iaw.115 However, if the court was correct in
upholding the right of the corporation to utilize the rule, it would seem
even more inconsistent to deny that right only in those cases in which a
fraudulent scheme includes corporate insiders. A refusal to apply rule IOb-5
in such cases because of the Birnbaum dicta that section IOb-5 was not
2118 F.2d 790, 7911 (2d Cir. 1956).
o 48 Stat. 895 (19114), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1958).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1949).
11 The court's distinction appears somewhat superficial, since the policy against harassment of corporate insurgents was not determinative in the Howard case. Moreover, the
statutory standard to guide the SEC in implementing § 14(a) is identical to the language
of § I0(b).
12 1911 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
13 See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961).
H See 11 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1770-71 (2d ed. 1961). But cf. Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
115 See 611 CoLUM. L. REV. 9114, 9411 (19611).
8
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directed at fraudulent mismanagement would prevent the application of
the rule to fraudulent securities transactions which fall within the language
of the rule. While it is true that there is no basis for imputing to Congress
an intent to draw into the federal courts all the facets of internal corporate
affairs on the basis of the rule-making power in section lO(b), neither is
there any indication that Congress intended to exclude from the purview
of that section only those fraudulent transfers involving corporate insiders.
Moreover, there is little possibility that a flood of suits alleging corporate
mismanagement and basing federal jurisdiction on a securities transaction
will arise, since it may be inferred from the principal case that an action
which may be brought in a state court for a breach of the fiduciary duty of
corporate insiders will not be subject to federal jurisdiction under rule
lOb-5 unless a fraudulently induced issuance of securities is a major element
of the alleged mismanagement. Finally, in a derivative suit by trustees in
bankruptcy or stockholders when a corporation has been defrauded of its
stock, the advantages of granting a corporate right of action under rule lOb-5
would appear to outweigh greatly the resulting asymmetry in the law
governing corporate mismanagement. A right of corporate recovery eliminates the practical difficulties involved in a class action under the rule on
behalf of a large group of defrauded purchasers. 16 If a corporation's action
for fraud were brought without the procedural and jurisdictional benefits
of the act, effective recovery would be less likely.17
The most significant aspect of the decision would appear to be the promise it holds for avoiding the conflicting and overly technical rules governing
corporate actions for promoter's illegal profits by the use of rule lOb-5.18
Promoters have succeeded in escaping liability to the corporation for a sale
of overvalued property to the corporation in exchange for its stock where
the promoter, at the time of the transaction, owned all of the authorized
stock.19 The theory applied is that the company should not be allowed to
16 See Cherner v. Transatron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962) in
which the court refused, on the basis of the policy against a fomenting of litigation, to
authorize the giving of notice by plaintiff's attorney to other investors who were allegedly
defrauded by violations of the Securities Act of 1933.
17 See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961), in which stockholders in a derivative action for a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were not required to post security for costs. Section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides for venue and service of process in any district in which
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business. See also Hooper v.
Mountain State Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961).
18 See generally Frohling, The Promoter and Rule lOb-5; Basis for Accountability,
48 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1962). Although the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act
. of 1933 have greatly diminished the possibility of promoter's fraud, the danger of injury
to a corporation still exists, since a substantial portion of financing is exempt from
registration. Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1958).
19 Hays v. The Georgian, 280 Mass. IO, 181 N.E. 765 (1932); cf. Jeffs v. Utah Power 8c
Light Co., 136 Me. 454, 12 A.2d 592 (1940). In a minority of courts, the promoter need
only have purchased all the issued stock to employ this defense. E.g., Old Dominion
Copper Mining 8c Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908); Ball v. Breed, Elliot 8c
Harrison, 294 Fed. 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 584 (1924).
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repudiate a sale to which it has consented. The elements of promoter's
fraud and those of the principal case are substantially identical, i.e., the
use of fraud to induce the issuance of stock for inadequate compensation.
Although the corporate insider in the principal case apparently did not
control the corporation, the technical defense of consent, which is merely
a fiction where the promoter occupies both sides of the transaction, should
be ineffective in a rule IOb-5 action in view of the expanding concept of
liability-creating conduct under the rule.20
Since no clear answer concerning the existence of a corporate right of
action under rule IOb-5 is provided by the cases, or by speculation as to
legislative intent,21 it would appear that the issue will be resolved, at least
tacitly, by a consideration of the practical advantages and disadvantages of
alternative results. Viewed in this light, the availability of federal jurisdiction to an issuing corporation to facilitate effective redress of an injury
brought about by an insider's rule I0b-5 violation is clearly consistent with
the broad congressional objective of protecting the integrity of the securities trading process.
Charles K. Dayton
20 See Cady, Roberts 8: Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I 76803 (SEC Nov. 8, 1961); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-26 (1950). Promoters have sometimes escaped liability by
taking an entire issue of no-par shares. E.g., Piggly Wiggly Del., Inc. v. Bartlett, 97 N.J. Eq.
469, 129 Atl. 413 (1925). It is doubtful whether such a maneuver would preclude liability
in an action under rule l0b-5, since the fraudulent conduct and the injury to a corporation are substantially the same when par value stock is issued. See BALLANTINE, CORPORA·
TIONS 841-42 (1946). But cf. Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963); 13
STAN. L. R.Ev. 378 (1961).
21 See authorities cited note 5 supra.

